III. The Wireless Philadelphia Problem

Wireless Philadelphia is dead.

What was left of the title — once the 2004 promise of a wirelessly-connected Philadelphia — was lost this May when the nonprofit that shared the initiative's name rebranded itself as the Digital Impact Group to focus on bridging the city's digital divide. It was once charged with overseeing Atlanta-based Internet service provider EarthLink in managing the country's first municipal Wi-Fi program, a program that was never fully realized.

"There's nothing more painful to us than Wireless Philadelphia," says Frank. "It was a massive mistake."

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In April 2005, then-Mayor John F. Street formally announced the program's launch, heralded by national media and futurists the world over. By selling commercially and partnering with the city, EarthLink would equip Philadelphia with a series of wireless hot zones. The Wireless Philadelphia oversight nonprofit would give out cheap accounts to low-income families, hoping to bridge the digital divide. Tourists and other residents could also purchase accounts by the day. Philadelphia would be the first city in the country to be completely wireless, and that would happen by 2006 at no municipal expense, the Street administration boasted.

By July of that year the completion date was pushed to the middle of 2007, then to November 2007, then the first quarter of 2008. In December 2007, with Street on the way out and the new Nutter administration coming in, rumors began to surface that EarthLink wanted out of its contract. By May 2008, it was, taking its abandoned 10-year contract to the courts. The next month, a new company, Network Acquisition, manned by a group of local IT consultants, bought out EarthLink's $16.8 million in equipment, but any hopes of salvaging the dream were crushed by promises never realized.

Fear remains that the broken promises of Wireless Philadelphia haven't been forgotten, says California-based broadband consultant Craig Settles, considering how much the initiaitive was touted to a city not known for high expectations.

"You have a difficult road to work through," Settles says in a telephone interview with Technically Philly.

The responsibility of overcoming the technology malaise burdening the city's public sector has fallen to that Nutter administration, namely Frank, the city CIO with a Wolf Blitzer-like white beard and bigger, broader technology plans for the region.

"[Wireless Philadelphia] was a commercial thing. That's all it was. No outcomes. 'Let's just wire up the city. Let's just wire the city and give free access,' and we got exactly what we deserved," Frank says. "There is no free lunch. It's not the wires, it's what you do with them. We didn't focus one ounce of energy on what to do with them."

So that's why his Digital Philadelphia plan — only bigger, bolder and less direct — may seem crazy.

And no matter how determined Frank is, if any lesson is to be squeezed from the Wireless Philadelphia stone, it's that when big city governments dabble with innovation, it takes more than active bureaucrats.

Settles says that, for all the complaints about Mayor Street and the "perceived faults" of his CIO Dianah Neff, they both made clear that the focus of their big plan was to help increase access and moved ahead quickly with their strategic plan.

"They did a 90-day business planning excercise that I thought was totally awe inspiring. Government doesn't move that fast, but in that ninety days, they had focus groups, town meetings, went out to communities and wrote up a reasonably respctable plan," Settles says now. "If that was to be replicated — a clear vision stated from the mayor's office and people sign off on that vision, they're halfway there."

Street was unavailable to offer Technically Philly a comment on Wireless Philadelphia.

"But one of the biggest downfalls there, is [the thought] that we can get something for nothing, that we can rely on one organization to solve the communication needs of Philadelphia without really recognizing that government has to play a role, particularly in serving the poorest residents which aren't a profit center for corporations," says Beth McConnell, Executive Director of Media & Democracy Coalition, a broadband inclusion advocacy group.

"It was a mistake to essentially rule out and eliminate government investment and involvement. It's easier for us to avoid that mistake now when there's federal money available, but I also think that in terms of vision for economic development, what means for the city looking in investing in technology is something the city should do whether the times are tight or not," McConnell adds.

Of course, Digital Philadelphia is meant to solve all that, by utilizing federal dollars to combine the missions of municipal advancement and social equity through technology. But that's just the fear, some warn, that Digital Philadelphia is just a bigger, bolder vision from a city that is still dealing with the failed expectations of Wireless Philadelphia.

"[Digital Philadelphia is] a broader technology strategy for public safety, city services and economic development, with no emphasis on wireless access and connectivity," Frank says.

"I'm looking at a strategy that leverages all the assets of the city."

The Wireless Philadelphia Problem is written by Christopher Wink